IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW | Azmi Bishara: Israel is not looking for allies, but for clients

In less than three years, the Middle East has witnessed a series of geopolitical upheavals, with which the region is far from finished contending.

The Palestinian question is experiencing the most severe crisis in its history. Both armed struggle and the diplomatic route appear to have failed, and, at this stage, no clear alternative is emerging.

At the same time, Lebanon has just endured a devastating war and remains threatened by a prolonged Israeli occupation. Public opinion there is deeply divided, both over Hezbollah and the framework agreement signed between Lebanon and Israel.

Syria, too, confronted with Israel’s hegemonic ambitions, has entered a new era with the fall of the Assad regime but must face numerous identity and sectarian demons.

Born in Nazareth in 1956, Azmi Bishara is one of the leading Palestinian intellectuals in the Arab world.

His involvement goes beyond Palestine to embrace the broader struggle for democracy in the region. He has written extensively on political thought, social theory, and philosophy.

He is currently the general director of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (CAREP) and chairman of the board of trustees of the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, founded by CAREP. He agreed to answer questions from L’Orient-Le Jour on the state of the Palestinian question and the upheavals reshaping the region, particularly in Syria and Lebanon.


In the face of the current political deadlock in Palestine, what steps should or could Palestinian leaders, Arab states, and, more broadly, the international community take in order to begin charting a path toward a solution?
I cannot respond by saying what they "should do." The institutions you mention—Palestinian leaders, Arab states, and what is called the international community, which in my view exists only as a metaphor—act according to their interests and the balance of power, and sometimes, perhaps, according to the prevailing values in their respective societies. But they certainly do not act on others’ advice. I am therefore not in a position to offer any in an interview such as this.

What I can say is that those who are sincerely committed to a just settlement of the Palestinian question should not, at this point, think in terms of "solutions." The very concept of a solution is almost exclusively diplomatic language, and the current balance of power allows no "just" solution.

I would prefer that, at this juncture, we emphasize the need to name the nature of the regime in Palestine. It is a settler-colonial regime that has created an apartheid system, and justice demands the dismantling of this apartheid. Once the parties involved become convinced that this regime cannot endure, they will decide whether they wish to live in a single binational state or in two separate states.

I must emphasize that living in a single state is only possible if it is accepted by the majority of the population—that is, by a majority of both Israelis and Palestinians.

One can, of course, analyze, without prescribing anything, the situation of the institutions and powers you mention, as well as the reasons why the demand for justice in the Palestinian question has been relegated to the background. They have grown accustomed to the idea that the "international arrangements" governing Palestine today are reduced to what the United States and Israel agree upon together, then impose upon the "international community" and the Arab parties.

American-Israeli understandings regarding our region have replaced international law. These understandings do not preclude disagreements, but, at this stage, they have taken the place of international law.

Israel, for its part, is trying to turn the Palestinian and Lebanese files—and, to some extent, that of southern Syria—into Israeli domestic affairs. It relies for this on its superiority in power and on the marginalization of the Palestinian cause by Arab regimes, which are seeking to serve their own interests by accommodating the United States and normalizing relations with Israel.

None of this changes the fact that what is being built on the ground is a regime of racial segregation that cannot be accepted. The struggle against this regime must be organized such that the opponent is clearly and indisputably identified.
 

Would you say that today both avenues, that of armed struggle on the one hand and negotiations on the other, have definitively failed?
Yes. I have previously argued that both paths, each in its own way, have failed. When I speak of the failure of the military path, I mean its failure as a liberation strategy. Resistance in its various forms, on the other hand, is a product of the reality of occupation, and it will continue in one form or another.

The main task now is to hold out on the land over the long term. This implies taking care of the material living conditions of the Palestinians, for as the Arabic saying goes, "you must have endurance."

There is no imminent "solution" to the reality of apartheid. For Palestinians to be able to remain on their land as the country’s indigenous population and as a people in the modern sense, they must build institutions and preserve them.

It is also necessary to continue to promote a discourse of justice expressed in democratic language understandable worldwide and that addresses both Palestinians and Israelis.

To give up certain elements of justice today would gain nothing. These concessions would simply be made for free, as Israel is intoxicated by its own power. There are clear plans to annex the territories occupied in 1967 and to incite large segments of the Palestinian population to emigrate.

Any concession made today simply vanishes into nothingness, for there is no form of political parity between any Palestinian leadership and Israel.
 

It should be noted nonetheless the significant support the Palestinian cause is receiving around the world today, particularly within the civil societies of Northern countries. What impact could this have in the long term?
Major changes are indeed taking place in global public opinion: the hegemony of the Zionist narrative is receding, and Israel, along with its allies in Western governing institutions, has been forced to resort to coercion to impose this narrative. This is a new development, the consequences of which are still too early to measure.

The Palestinian question has not yet become sufficiently prioritized in Western political agendas to decide the outcomes of elections in one country or another, but its weight is growing. More importantly, Israel’s influence is declining, which could, in time, lead to a shift at the decision-making level itself. This has not happened yet; I am simply saying it could happen.

There is another dimension. After the revolutionary moment that swept the Arab world from 2011 to 2013, then during the new wave in 2019, the counter-revolution—and forces anxious for the survival of their regimes—came to repress even shows of solidarity with Palestine. In my view, however, this has not changed the popular convictions, as will become evident as soon as public opinion is able to express what it thinks about Palestine.
 

Could a possible defeat of Benjamin Netanyahu in the next elections unlock, even slightly, the situation of the Palestinians?
A defeat of Benjamin Netanyahu in the next elections would broadly serve Israel’s interests internationally, as much of the country’s current toxic image is tied to his persona and the type of coalition he has assembled, which includes fascist thugs like Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.

On the Palestinian side, however, I think Netanyahu’s replacement would have positive effects—not because it would lead to a political solution, but because it would improve the conditions for Palestinians to hold out over the long term, since the settlers’ influence in the Israeli government would diminish.

If it managed to defeat Netanyahu, the next Israeli coalition would be more willing to engage in dialogue with Palestinian leaders and to respect American-Israeli arrangements regarding Gaza. It might also hesitate to pursue annexation, since it believes in demographic separation.

No justice is involved in this. But it could make Palestinians’ lives less difficult, and since the strategy I’ve outlined rests on their capacity to endure over time, this is not insignificant.
 

You have mentioned the solidarity of Arab societies with the Palestinians. Yet this seems to be losing ground among certain segments of opinion, particularly in countries where Tehran exerts—or exerted until recently—significant influence. It now seems to be associated with the "axis of resistance" led by Iran...
I think that, taken as a whole, Arab public opinion remains attached to justice for the Palestinians. But one of the difficulties of the Palestinian question lies in its entanglement with both the Jewish question and the Arab question.

I will set aside the Jewish question and its impact on Western public attitudes toward Palestine, to address one aspect of what I have called, in one of my books, the “Arab question”: that of despotic Arab regimes that had adopted the slogan of liberating Palestine.

This adherence was not mere deception. Some Arab nationalist currents that governed several Arab states truly believed in the Palestinian cause. But, due to their internal structure, these regimes eventually became dictatorships based on alliances between security services and economic elites and, in some cases, on regional and sectarian solidarities.

Some circles in the Arab world eventually associated these regimes with their rhetorical excesses over Palestine. A trend then emerged, blaming the war with Israel for these states’ decline: politically, because the slogan "no voice higher than the battle" was used to stifle dissent; economically, because the war effort weighed on their economies.

In reality, all this is a mystification. By a paradoxical reversal, these regimes’ propaganda about themselves was taken at face value and then recycled by some liberal-leaning circles to justify abandoning the Palestinian cause. In my view, these circles have never actually subscribed to true liberalism, for which the defense of citizen’s rights, human rights, and freedoms comes first. A similar phenomenon occurred in Eastern European countries, where elites now in power turned their backs on anything associated with former communist regimes.
 

The Iranian question, then, fits within this broader framework...
A similar phenomenon occurred with Iran, particularly in countries where it sought to extend its influence by exploiting sectarian divides, such as Lebanon and Iraq.

It must be recalled, however, that some Lebanese circles favored normalization with Israel well before this period—indeed, since the days following independence. This argument is therefore not enough to explain the Lebanese case. This is deeply linked to a minority mentality that refuses to integrate into an egalitarian citizenship within society while maintaining its singularity. Nor can the mistakes of Hezbollah be overlooked.

But I will partially join you. Arab regimes have indeed abandoned the Palestinian cause, while Iran has attempted to claim a monopoly on it under the guise of supporting resistance, in order to expand its influence in countries marked by Sunni-Shia diversity, but also for ideological reasons. Among the leading figures of the first and second generations of the Iranian revolution, some harbor a sincere hostility toward Israel.

The problem lies in the fact that this hostility has manifested in Arab societies through the channel of a particular sectarian community, thus linking resistance to this community. Under these conditions, a reaction of rejection was inevitable.

But we must never accept that this is used to justify normalization with Israel. The Palestinians are not responsible, and Israel has no concern whatsoever for the well-being of other communities or of Arab countries.

The Israeli establishment regards itself as a foreign and threatened body. It distrusts everyone, will settle for nothing less than relationships of vassalage, and does not understand what an alliance is, even with Arab forces seeking alliance with it. It does not want allies, only clients.
 

In Lebanon’s particular case, how do you judge Hezbollah’s choices?
I have no doubt that Hezbollah has tried to combine its real resistance to Israel and sincere solidarity with the Palestinians with its loyalty to Iran, justifying the latter by stating that Iran is the only power willing to support the resistance.

After the liberation of 2000, however, Hezbollah proved unable to transcend the sectarian framework, even within the Shia community itself.

Its integration into Lebanese political life has remained conditional, and it has continued to question the patriotism of other political forces.

In other words, it has not sought to forge genuine compromises that would have enabled the preservation of a strong Lebanese position, in solidarity with Palestine and opposed to Israel, while actually placing its weapons at the state’s disposal in this context. This should have occurred alongside real reforms encompassing the rights of Palestinians in Lebanon, together with the refusal to normalize relations with Israel.

It has remained incapable of influencing overall Lebanese policy while preserving its own organization, cohesion, and weapons. The current polarization is a result of that situation.
 

And what do you think of Hezbollah’s decisions after October 7?
Hezbollah was not consulted about the October 7 operation, any more than the majority of Gaza’s inhabitants or Iran itself.

But it understood that its slogans on Palestine and solidarity with the resistance would be nothing but empty formulas if it remained silent in the face of the war of extermination waged in Gaza.

One could therefore say it was "drawn," even "forced," into this battle. That is the consequence of its situation: its inability to integrate into Lebanese political life and its mistrust toward the country’s other political forces. As you know, the result was disastrous for Lebanon, just as the October 7 operation had catastrophic consequences for Gaza and exacted a heavy toll from it.

As for Hezbollah’s current options, I cannot examine them separately from the eagerness of Lebanese state leaders—chief among them the presidency—to negotiate with Israel in order to decouple the Lebanese file from the Iranian-American file, nor from their willingness to accept for this purpose American-Israeli conditions, including some that strongly resemble an alliance with Israel against Hezbollah.

The entire language of the framework agreement points in that direction: it is now about demanding Hezbollah's disarmament on the grounds that, under this agreement, it would be the cause of the Israeli occupation. This narrows Lebanon’s room for maneuver instead of expanding it.

It is at least fortunate that the different parties are still sitting together in the same government. Shared frameworks, however deep the divide between them, can indeed serve as safeguards against civil war breaking out.
 

Did the Lebanese government have any option other than the framework agreement that was signed?
The real question is not whether there were other options, but whether what was done really constituted an option.

I think this was an American diktat to which the presidency gave in.

It was not a true choice either, since it changed nothing on the ground: Israel remains the arbiter and dominant party. It is Israel that decides, under this agreement, whether the Lebanese army has succeeded in disarming Hezbollah.

The agreement has also imposed a new constraint on Lebanon: it has stripped it of the last instrument it had left, namely diplomatic and legal action against Israel. I have never heard of a diplomatic option that deprives one party of any diplomatic recourse. Yet Article 13 contains an obligation to refrain from any diplomatic or legal activity hostile to Israel. What, then, is left to Lebanon?

What has changed is that Hezbollah is now the accused, not Israel. Those who signed this agreement have formally admitted that the Israeli presence is linked to Hezbollah’s disarmament wherever it is present, whatever region of Lebanon is concerned.
 

In your opinion, what are Israel’s real objectives in Lebanon?
I believe Israel wants to turn Lebanon into an Israeli zone of influence. From its perspective, the choice now boils down to a choice between Iranian and Israeli influence. It also wants significant portions of southern Lebanon to become more than a simple zone of influence: a territory under its security control and surveillance.

Lebanon is an Arab state with a uniqueness in the positive sense. It has a diversity not found in any other Arab country, a high degree of social and cultural development, and a remarkable concentration of talent. In reasonable conditions, Lebanon could play a considerable role in the Arab world. The Israeli attempt to impose its influence there is a recipe for a long and destructive conflict that will harm everyone.
 

Among the events that have most profoundly shaken regional geopolitics is the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. Despite the initial hopes, many Syrian democrats are today very worried about the country’s future, particularly because of sectarian violence against minorities and certain measures suggesting a gradual Islamization of society. In your view, what have been the main errors or failings of those currently in power? And can—and above all does—Ahmed al-Chareh want to act differently?
From the last years of the Syrian revolution—which started as a revolution before degenerating into near-civil war—the democratic option was no longer on the agenda.

The forces that continued to compete over Syria, whether local or regional, did not have any truly democratic program. They were not democratic in origin either.

Those of us who supported the Syrian revolution did so for reasons related to freedom and justice: because the regime refused any reform, because reform had become impossible, and because it waged war against its own people as if they were the enemy.

Personally, I became convinced the regime had to go even after the revolution nearly completely receded, when the risk appeared of Syria splitting into four zones. In parallel, sanctions were exhausting the Syrian people and the regime had itself degenerated into a federation of criminal gangs and a drug trafficker. In every sense, it was therefore necessary to rid the country of this regime.

All we could hope was that the forces that defeated it and who now govern Syria from Damascus would first preserve the unity of the country and prevent it from descending into chaos and civil war.

Armed factions marginalized the political opposition. Responsibility for this lies not only with those factions, but also with a regime that left the population no choice but to take up arms. Despite all the criticisms I levy at them, those political opposition forces at least had a declared democratic program. The current authorities have none.

The road ahead will be long, and the objectives are more modest: reunifying Syria, establishing relatively satisfactory governance, and fighting corruption.
 

How can this be achieved?
The essential condition—whether the regime is democratic or not—is to recognize Syrian citizenship as the foundation of national belonging and of the relationship between the individual and the state, in both rights and duties. This principle must extend to the very structure of the army. 

It is especially important not to turn the Syrian majority into a confessional community. A majority must never become a sect.

This also means rejecting a reading of the country’s history claiming that Syria was divided between a dominant sect and a dominated sect, because this reading is simply false.

The despotic Syrian regime undoubtedly relied on regional solidarities that took an Alawite sectarian form, just as the despotic Iraqi regime relied on regional solidarities with a Sunni sectarian dimension.

But that does not mean that, in Iraq, the Shia were the dominated and the Sunnis the dominant, nor that in Syria, the Alawites ruled while the Sunnis were ruled. No Syrian regime could ever have governed without the Sunnis.

This is how the previous historical period must be understood if one wants to make it possible for the country to return to normal life.

This is why Syrian revolution supporters, myself among them, immediately recognized the gravity of the events that took place on the coast in March 2025, then in Suwayda in July that same year. In Suwayda, the stakes are nationally significant given Israeli intervention in Syrian internal affairs. Israel’s ambitions in this regard are openly displayed.
 

What could the government do?
In my view, the government could win the loyalty of the inhabitants of Suwayda province and isolate those who support Israel by changing its policy—or, let’s say, the mindset that prevails in its first circle of supporters, in which these inhabitants are seen as foreigners. Yet they are deeply rooted in Syria, present throughout its history and all over its territory. They are citizens who should be placed on an equal footing with all others.

This is a political and cultural problem that the current Syrian government must solve. One possible path could be to make sectarianism an offense and prosecute those who inflame it, because in a country like Syria, it is a matter of national survival.

There is today in Syria a reasonable margin of freedom of expression. This should precisely serve to raise such questions and debate the country’s future.

Whoever governs Syria —current leaders or others—inherits an extremely complex situation, characterized by a particularly dense entanglement of local and regional issues.

That does not mean that one should refrain from criticizing practices involving religious coercion or sectarian elements, nor from criticizing a lax attitude toward Israeli occupation in the South. But such criticism must be voiced responsibly. Its purpose should not be to undermine the transition, but to contribute to its success.
 

Interview conducted by: Soulayma MARDAM BEY
16 July 2026
Source: L'Orient Today

This interview was also published in French in L'Orient-Le Jour.